News recently broke that Iran
and Syria
have been providing Hezbollah with significant weaponry. Of deepest concern to Israel, Hezbollah
is believed to be acquiring rockets with the capability to hit deep inside of
Israeli territory. While initially this may first appear to be another negative
development for a troubled region, a systemic analysis of shows that while this
will have a detrimental effect on Israeli power in the region it will likely
boost regional security making future conflict less likely.
The rockets which Hezbollah are acquiring are believed to
have an intermediate range but are technically relatively unsophisticated.
Essentially, these rockets are fired in a direction not necessarily at a
target. This means that they would be useless on a conventional battlefield as
they are incapable of strategically striking targets. These rockets were
designed to be fired at cities, but how could the acquisition of weapons to
kill civilians by a terrorist organization be a good thing?
Currently the balance of power is heavily in favor of Israel, to the
extent to which no regional power holds a credible deterrent of any capacity. Israel is generally free to do as it will, be it
blockade Gaza, settle East Jerusalem, or perhaps
most notably, put troops on the ground in Lebanon in an attempt to disarm
Hezbollah. If a power gains the capability of causing significant damage to
Israeli cities deterrence may emerge providing an icy cold cease fire to the
region.
Consider the example of the Koreas. For the last several
decades North Korea’s
enormous arsenal of missiles and artillery aimed at Seoul has prevented war from occurring on the
peninsula. South Korea’s
military, with United States
assistance could relatively easily overthrow the North Korean regime, but the
potential casualties in Seoul,
literally millions, has deterred the military option. Certainly nobody is
smiling about the situation, but further conflict has been averted.
This model is a good one for considering the potential
effect of an armed Hezbollah on regional security. With the ability to cause
immense damage to Israel,
but knowing that militarily it is still inferior to the Israeli Defense Forces
and that Israel
possess nuclear capabilities, a situation in which the cost of conflict would
be unbearably high could emerge, essentially mutual deterrence. However, it is
not quite so simple as two problems are yet to be resolved; rational actor
theory, and the closing window of opportunity.
Rational actor theory maintains that all actors are rational
and will not seek conflict in which the costs are known to outweigh the
benefits. In this instance it means that Israel must believe that Hezbollah
will act in a manner which seeks to avoid its own destruction, in order for deterrence
to work. This has traditionally been a given, but with the rising prominence of
suicide bombers, many are questioning whether the traditional rules of
deterrence hold true with individuals and non-state actors. Afterall, how does
one deter a suicide bomber? Questions over deterrence continue, but I believe that
the more involved a non-state actor is within a state, the more likely
deterrence is to work. In the case of Hezbollah the organization has assumed a
state-like role in many territories leading me to believe that deterrence could
be effective in preventing future conflict.
The second issue at hand is that of the window of opportunity. If
and/or when Hezbollah becomes armed with an arsenal that can credibly threaten
the security of Israel, Israel’s power relative to Lebanon will
decrease. This provides a strong incentive for Israel to prevent the arming of
Hezbollah. The moment from ...